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Preface 
This report aims to shed some light on the determinants of the R&D intensity gap between 
the EU and its main competitors (with special focus on the US). Using Industrial Scoreboard 
data covering the period 2002-2010, we first investigate the role of structural (i.e. across 
sectoral differences) as opposed to intrinsic (i.e. within sectoral differences) factors. We 
confirm that the composition of the economy (the "structure") is by far the largest 
contributing factor, which has the immediate consequence that, in order to close the gap, 
the EU has to move resources and employment from low-tech to middle/high tech sectors. 
Horizontal policies (such as generic R&D tax credits) are unlikely to achieve this objective.  
In the second part of the report, we verify to what extent the innovative performance 
(measured by R&D intensity) of EU and US firms differs across broad age-groups (young, 
middle-age and older firms). We also verify whether - within the three different age 
groups- the availability of internal resources affects EU firms differently from US firms. 
Our results indicate that young EU firms rely much more than young US firms on the 
existence of internal financial resources (i.e. past period profits). This is interpreted as an 
indication that young firms in the EU face more problems when trying to get funding for 
their innovative projects and calls for an age– and perhaps sector- specific support scheme. 
Given its content, this report is very relevant for the research line on innovation policies 
carried out by the Information Society (IS) Unit at JRC-IPTS in the context of the IDEA Action 
during the last two years. 
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1. Introduction 
R&D activity, defined by the Frascati manual as “creative work undertaken on a systematic 
basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge and the use of this stock of knowledge to 
devise new applications” has long been recognized as a source of productivity, at the micro-
meso and aggregate level. This is as true for business R&D as it is for Government R&D.  
Business R&D activity directly impacts on firms’ productivity because it leads to new goods 
and services, it improves the quality of existing goods and services, and leads to improved 
or new production processes.1 Studies that use firm level data to look at the direct 
relationship between productivity and business R&D typically find an output elasticity of 
own R&D between 1% and 25%, but centred at around 8% (see Hall et al., 2010, and 
Griliches, 1995). However, the own/private effect of R&D on labour productivity (or TFP) is 
not the only relevant factor. In fact, endogenous growth theory (Romer, 1986) has shown 
that long-term growth can be obtained thanks to knowledge spillovers generated by R&D 
activity (as opposed to external forces driving technological change, as in a typical Solow-
type macro model). The literature on the impact of such spillovers shows high variability in 
the estimates (and this is partly to be explained by the nature of the problem), but there is 
consistent evidence that such spillovers exist and they are sizable.2 
Within a macro context, Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2001) find a long-run elasticity of 
TFP (computed at the country level) to business R&D of about 0.13, which is considered to 
be high, especially since it captures mostly the social return to R&D. They also notice that 
the (social) return to R&D stock has been increasing with time, confirming the hypothesis 
that R&D is becoming an increasingly important activity in the knowledge-based economy.  
                                                        
1  R&D not only affects directly the ability of a given organization (or country) to innovate and hence 
improve productivity, but it also increase its “absorptive capacity” (see Choen and Levinthal, 1989), hence 
creating an environment more receptive to innovation stimuli coming from outside. Disentangling the 
direct from the indirect effect is far from easy, but there is empirical evidence that the indirect effect is 
sizeable (see Griffith et al. 2003: additional evidence in favour of the absorptive capacity role of R&D is 
coming from studies that document the positive correlation between foreign R&D and productivity, see 
Coe and Helpman, 1995). 
2  As argued by Hall et al. (2010), from a firm’s perspective spillovers can come from R&D activity 
performed 1) by other firms in the same sector; 2) by firms in other sectors; 3) by public research 
laboratories and universities and 4) by firms’ laboratories and government policies of other countries. 
From the domestic country perspective, the first three sources are components of the social or aggregate 
return to R&D, while only the fourth is a spillover. So “whether we label something a spillover depends on 
whether it is being created by the unit under the investigation or by an entity external to that unit”. This 
also means that estimates of spillover effects tend to be larger when evaluated at the firm level, relative 
to the sector or country level. However, this does not mean that the social return should be lower at the 
country level (in fact, the opposite is true). 
 6 
While providing an exhaustive review of the relationship between R&D and productivity (at 
the micro, meso or macro level of aggregation) is outside the scope of this work, we believe 
that there is sufficient evidence supporting the hypothesis that R&D matters for 
productivity and growth.3.  
This conclusion is important in the context of the EU-US productivity gap: if R&D is 
important for growth and there are both a productivity and an R&D gap, closing the R&D 
gap is a precondition for closing the productivity gap.4 
In order to account for differences in size, the R&D gap is often presented in terms of R&D 
intensity gap (R&D over GDP or value added). When comparing countries, focusing on the 
measured R&D intensity gap is interesting, especially if one of the countries is at the 
technological frontier, because it shows how far a given country is from the level of R&D 
that it “could” exhibit given its size (as measured by GDP). Hence, a positive US-EU gap 
means that, relative to its size, the EU is not spending enough in R&D, and this, given the 
positive relationship between R&D and productivity, implies that the EU is not as productive 
as it could be.  
In fact, this is exactly the perspective that the EU Commission and the EU Council have 
taken when setting the 3% target for (public and private) R&D spending as a percentage of 
GDP.5 A part from the fact that the choice of determining a target based on the R&D/GDP 
ratio is debatable,6 the Lisbon target clearly indicates that knowledge-led-growth is among 
the main objectives of the EU (see also Mathieu and van Pottelsberghe, 2008).  
                                                        
3  Their results also show that R&D intensity has an additional positive effect on the elasticity of TFP to R&D, 
pointing to some form of increasing return to scale to R&D investment, while the share of government 
spending has a negative impact on the elasticity of TFP to R&D stock (but this seems mostly due to the 
military components), pointing to some form of crowding out. 
4  For a study that uses micro data on the productivity gap see Ortega Argilés et al. (2011), where the 
effectiveness of R&D in the EU relative to the US is evaluated. For studies that look at the productivity gap 
at a macro level, using a sectoral decomposition, see O’Mahony and van Ark (2003) and Denis et al. 
(2004). See also Bassanini et al. (2000) and McMorrow and Roger (2009). Some studies cast some doubts 
on the role of R&D in accounting for the different evolution of TFP in the EU relative to the US, see Havik 
et al. (2008). 
For studies that look directly at the productivity gap (and at the role of ICT) see van Ark at al. (2002, 
2003) and Inklaar et al. (2005). 
5  In fact, the Lisbon agenda set a target of about 3% for the R&D intensity ratio for the year 2010, with two 
thirds of which to be funded by the business sector and the rest to be funded by governments. 
6  Using R&D intensity as a target as opposed to selecting a given nominal value for R&D expenditures has 
the obvious advantage that it does not depend upon inflation (as long as the same price index can be used 
for GDP and R&D, which is debated by some), It also has the advantage that across-countries-sectors 
comparability is possible. However, choosing the R&D intensity as a target for the overall EU has the clear 
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From a research perspective, the first step is the analysis of the size and origin of the 
overall gap, where by “origin” we mean the role of the different economic sectors. In fact, 
there exists a consistent body of literature documenting the role of sectoral composition in 
accounting for the EU-US gap. By decomposing the overall gap into a structural component 
(which reflects the role of differences in sectoral composition for a given average sectoral 
intensity) and an intrinsic component (which reflects the within-sector R&D intensity gap, 
for a given average sectoral composition), it is possible to document which of the two 
components seem to be mostly responsive for the gap at a certain point in time or over a 
certain time horizon.7  
The evidence on the role of the structural vs. the intrinsic component is not uncontroversial 
and this has very strong implications in terms of policy implications (see O’Sullivan 2007). 
In fact, if the intrinsic component is found to be dominant, it means that –on average- the 
EU is showing a lower R&D intensity across the board, which also implies that there is a list 
of candidate policies to increases R&D spending (and hence intensity) that might be 
effective in the short run. These go from a tax credit to R&D activity, to improving 
Intellectual Property rights, to favouring foreign direct investment. If, on the contrary, the 
structural effect is dominant, the ability to reduce the gap in the short run is greatly 
reduced by the fact that the latter is arising from the structural composition of the 
economy, which is not likely to be altered by the policies typically considered to affect R&D 
intensity in the short run.8 
Erken and van Es (2007), using the OECD ANBERD and STAN database over the period 
1987-2003 for 15 countries (including the US) and 36 industries, find that the intrinsic 
                                                                                                                                                                             
disadvantage that it refers to an aggregate (the EU) which hides great across-country differences. If it is 
clear that some countries, such as Finland and Sweden, are very likely to satisfy the 3% target, others, 
such a Cyprus or Romania have values that are well below 1%. What this means is that, even if the overall 
target where to be satisfied at the EU level, a large across-country inequality is likely to remain. On this 
see van Pottelsberghe (2008). In fact, individual EU countries have selected their own year 2020 R&D 
intensity targets; see Innovation Union Competitiveness Report (2011). Finally, notice that since R&D 
expenditures, especially for the business sector, might not follow exactly the cycle, we have the paradox 
that the EU has more chances of reaching the target simply due to a decrease in GDP as opposed to an 
increase in R&D expenditures 
7  In general, the relevance of the structural effects tends to rise as the number of sectors used for the 
decomposition increases. This is to be expected given that the within sector differences in R&D intensity 
are likely to be reduced when we move to a more disaggregated sectoral composition. Moreover, the result 
of the decomposition is very sensitive to the measurement of R&D in the service industry, which, by itself, 
is a very complex task due to lack of homogeneity across countries. 
8  However, even horizontal policies might have a differential impact across sectors, since they affect 
differently marginal costs and benefits of R&D activity. We will come back to this later. 
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component is dominant over the structural one, and they argue that this is in large part 
driven by differences in the R&D intensity within the service industry (within the 
manufacturing sector the role of the intrinsic component is reduced). However, these 
results appear in total contradiction with those obtained by Mathieu and van Pottelsberghe 
(2008), who – studying the evolution of the R&D intensity gap in the manufacturing sector 
using sectoral data from OECD ANBERD and STAN – find that a large share of across 
sector-country-time variation in business R&D intensity can be explained by across-sector 
variation, pointing to the role of industrial specialization as one of the major determinants 
of aggregate R&D intensity, hence casting even more doubts on the usefulness of an 
across-the-board target (while for public sector R&D intensity the bulk of the variation can 
be explained by country specific factors). It should be stressed that Mathieu and van 
Pottelsberghe exclude services and this is crucial in delivering the results, since one of the 
drivers of the US-EU R&D intensity gap is the different R&D intensity in the service 
industry9 (especially in trade service industries).  
Moncada Paterno Castello et al. (2010), using firm level data obtained from the 2008 
Industrial Scoreboard,10 look at the structural vs. intrinsic component of the EU-US (and 
Japan) R&D intensity gap. From their analysis it is clear that the structural component is 
absolutely dominant since it accounts for 4/5 of the overall gap11 (in fact the intrinsic effect 
                                                        
9  This is mostly due to a different approach to sectoral classification of R&D activities across the Atlantic. In 
the EU most countries use a product-based classification, so that most of R&D are attributed to the 
manufacturing sector producing the product for which R&D activity was performed, while in the US the 
principal activity of the firm is a more widespread and used approach. In fact the NSF has estimated that 
roughly 93% of the R&D expenditures recorded under the US trade services industry should be allocated 
to the manufacturing industry. Duchene et al. (2010), using the NSF estimates re-evaluate the EU-US gap 
and get to a more balanced view: the gap is in both manufacturing and services, but the gap in services is 
now lower and the one in manufacturing is higher.  
10  Here are the main differences between Scoreboard and BERD data: Scoreboard data capture R&D 
investment by a given company, irrespective to the location where the R&D is performed, so that it 
captures the global corporate funding, while BERD data refer to R&D activities within a given territory. 
BERD includes non company sources of R&D while Scoreboard does not (so that the portion of R&D 
financed by public funding is excluded). Scoreboard collects data from audited financial accounts and 
reports, while BERD uses a stratified sample methodology. Moreover, Scoreboard provide information on 
sales, while BERD provides information on value added, so that R&D intensity can be defined in terms of 
R&D/sales for the former and R&D/Value added for the latter. Finally, BERD uses NACE classification while 
Scoreboard uses ICB classification.  
11  This result applies to the case in which the full set of EU companies is considered. The relevance of the 
structural gap is even higher when a reduced set of EU companies is used. 
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is reducing the EU gap relative to the US). The role of the structural component is also 
stressed in the “Knowledge for Growth Expert Group” report.12 
A paper that is closely related to our report is Ortega-Argilés and Brandsma (2010), where 
they use the four waves of the 2006 Industrial Scoreboard to test whether there is 
evidence of across-sector and across-countries variation in R&D intensity. They find 
evidence of large across-sector variation and that the US tends to have higher R&D 
intensity across all sectors.  
In the context of the R&D intensity gap, there have been some attempts to look more in 
depth at the sources of the structural gap, by considering firms demographics. This is 
related to the literature pointing to large EU vs. US differences in post-entry performance, 
and hence to the role of factors hindering firms’ growth13 and not just entry or exit (see 
Bartelsman et al. 2003 and Bartelsman et al. 2004). If EU firms are not able to grow as 
fast as their US counterparts, and this is true even in high-tech sectors, the effect of this in 
the context of the R&D intensity decomposition14 would be that the structural component 
dominates, simply because EU economies are not able to expand in the high growth - high 
R&D intensive sectors. Hence, analyzing the R&D intensity gap across different age groups 
becomes crucial. Cincera and Veugelers (Veugelers and Cincera, 2010) look at this issue 
using data from the 2008 Industrial Scoreboard dataset and find that: 1) a large fraction of 
leading innovators (34%) are young (i.e., born after 1975); 2) young leading innovators 
(yollies) are especially R&D intensive; 3) yollies tend to be especially present in high-tech 
sectors (especially Internet, Biotechnology and Software); 4) about 55% of the EU-US R&D 
intensity differential can be explained by the lower R&D intensity of EU yollies as compared 
to US yollies; 5) 92% of this intensity differential can be explained by the different sectoral 
composition (i.e., EU yollies are not in high R&D intensive sectors), and in particular by the 
biotechnology, pharmaceutical, semiconductors and Internet sectors. 
                                                        
12  A partially different story is contained in Uppenberg (2009), where the focus is on the three industries that 
show the highest R&D intensity (chemicals and pharmaceuticals, transport equipment and ICT and other 
non transport equipment), for which the evidence goes in favour of lower R&D intensity in the EU relative 
to US and Japan (at the same time showing that EU is more specialized in technology intensive 
manufacturing. But the picture changes when instead of nominal value added the computations are made 
in real value added. Within the ICT and other non-transport equipment industry, US and Japan are 
particularly specialized in ICT equipment production, where (relative to other sector) prices tend to decline 
much faster, which drives up the contribution of the ICT production sector in the economy. 
13  Such factors are identified in the cost of funds, administrative costs, lack of fully integrated market, lack 
of appropriate skills and presence of labour and product market regulation, all of which are believed to 
generate a comparative disadvantage for the EU relative to the US. 
14  On the role R&D gap in the ICT sector see Lindmark et al. (2010). 
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The policy implications arising from these results are immediate: in order to close the gap it 
is necessary to have policies directed at stimulating the growth of young firms in highly 
R&D intensive sectors (see also Veugelers 2009 and Schneider and Veugelers 2008). 
In the first part of this report, we present the evolution of the R&D intensity gap between 
the EU and its major competitors (US, Japan, BRIC, Asian Tigers) and then we look more 
closely at the role and evolution of the structural and intrinsic component for each pair-
wise comparison, by looking at four basic macro-sectors defined in term of their R&D 
intensity (as proposed by the OECD, see Hatzichronoglou 1997). 
In the second part of our work we concentrate on the EU-US R&D intensity gap and, by 
applying firm level analysis, we test whether the results obtained by the statistical 
decomposition of aggregate R&D intensity are confirmed. The evidence provided by this 
exercise is especially important because it allows us to perform a comparison where the 
ceteris paribus condition is more likely to be satisfied. In particular we test whether there is 
evidence of across-sector variability in R&D intensity and whether, within sectors, EU and 
US firms are performing any different. When doing this we control for factors such as size, 
cyclical effects, common macroeconomic shocks and company’s age. Age is important for 
at least two reasons. First, young companies might have more problems in finding access 
to financial resources that are necessary in order to invest in R&D. Second, young 
companies might be very aggressive in terms of innovation if they want to enter and 
succeed in markets where incumbents already exist. More generally, company age is 
important because it takes time to build, test and eventually change a given business 
model and there is plenty of evidence that young firms are those exhibiting the highest 
dynamism: if they do not grow they are likely to disappear, but if they grow they do so 
much faster that older firms (in part due to the basic growth mechanics). Therefore, our 
aim here is also to document the age profile for R&D intensity (i.e., analyze if and how the 
R&D intensity gap between EU and US companies is related to the age of the firm). Finally, 
we check if R&D intensity is affected by the abundance of internal funds (as captured by 
the profit/sales ratio), if this relationship changes with the age of the company and if the 
latter shows across-regional variation. 
On the one hand, our work extends the work by Moncada Paterno Castello et al. (2010) by 
looking at a much larger period (2002-2010) and this is very important because a long 
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time span is needed if one wants to look at the evolution of the gap and of its components. 
Besides, drawing conclusions from a single snapshot, while tempting, might be incorrect, if 
anything because of the simple reason that the EU and the US might not be perfectly 
aligned in terms of cycles (which affect both R&D investment and Sales but not necessarily 
in the same way).  
On the other hand, our work is close to Ortega-Argiléz and Brandsma (2010), but we look at 
the whole series of Industrial Scoreboard waves (hence gaining on the time dimension), 
formally testing the differential role of the main explanatory variables in the EU and the 
US. Besides, we also provide evidence with respect to the relationship between R&D 
intensity and age, hence following the insights from Veugelers and Cincera (2010). 
Our report proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss our approach and present the data. 
In Section 3, we look at the aggregate picture emerging from our exercise, while in Section 
4 we perform the firm level analysis. Section 5 concludes our work. 
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2. Data 
In this report, we use data from the EU Industrial R&D Scoreboard databases15 (henceforth 
the Scoreboard) in which R&D investment data, and economic and financial data from the 
last four financial years are presented for the 1,000 largest EU and 1,000 largest non-EU 
R&D investors.16 This database covers about 80% of all company R&D investments 
worldwide. All data within the Scoreboard are presented in EUR applying the last available 
exchange rate for the whole covered period (i.e., all data in year T Scoreboard use the 
exchange rate measured in year T-1, even if the observations refer to T-2, T-3, T-4). As a 
result, data from different Scoreboards are not directly comparable and they differ even for 
the same company in the same reference year.17 Therefore, we first transform all data into 
nominal values applying the exchange rate from the reference year and then we apply to 
each observation in the reference year the correct exchange rate. Then, we create a panel 
by joining all available Scoreboards. Furthermore, we drop those reference-year 
observations, for which a base year is available and which are different from this base 
year. If the base year is missing and there are more than one reference-year observations 
available, we employ the one from the closest Scoreboard.18  
The Scoreboard database collects information only about top R&D investors and hence 
omits small companies and this tends to bias the sample in favour of large firms. By 
applying the approach described above, when we fill in missing firm-year observations for 
companies below the R&D investment threshold by information from subsequent 
Scoreboards, we actually reduce such bias (e.g., we go towards the ‘real’ distribution).  
Another concern with the Scoreboard is that it applies different thresholds for EU and non-
EU companies. For instance, the 1000th EU company invested 4.5 million EUR in R&D in 
                                                        
15  http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/research/scoreboard_2010.htm 
16  The first issue, the 2004 Scoreboard (covering the period 2000-2003), comprises only the top 500 EU and 500 non-
EU R&D investors. Later Scoreboard issues from 2005 to 2007 report info on the top 700+700 R&D investors. Only 
starting in 2008, it comprises the top 1000+1000 R&D investors. 
17  The T Scoreboard covers the period of four years, from T-4 till T-1. Year T-1 is called the base year, while T-2, T-3, 
and T-4 are reference years. The T-1 exchange rate has been applied to transform data from other currencies to EUR 
for all three remaining years. 
18  To illustrate this, let’s consider a company from the 2007 Scoreboard, included with a base year 2006 and three 
additional reference years 2003-2005, thus covering the last four financial years. In the 2008 Scoreboard this 
company still belongs to the top R&D investors; hence it is there with a base year 2007 and year 2006 is as a 
reference year. Similarly, it is also in the 2009 and 2010 Scoreboards. We have four firm-year observations (1 base 
and 3 references) pointing to the same year, 2006. In this case, we drop all three reference years 2006, leaving this 
company only with the firm-year observation from its base year. At the same time, this company is not among the top 
R&D investors in any of the 2004, 2005 or 2006 Scoreboards. Therefore, we use its reference years coming from the 
2007 Scoreboard to fill in missing firm-year observations for the period 2003-2005. A general rule is that first we use 
all base-year observations and only if they are missing, we employ reference-year observations.  
 14 
2010. On the other hand, the 1000th non-EU company invested 32.7 million EUR in the 
same year. In order to make EU and non-EU samples more comparable, we choose to keep 
firms with at least 50 employees (so that the conditioning variable is not the same as R&D, 
the subject of our analysis). 
The resulting panel consists of 3,034 unique companies from 32 countries covering the 
period 2002-2010. In total it comprises 19,207 firm-year observations. This panel is thus 
unbalanced (each company stays in our sample for about 6 years on average). In a typical 
year, there are over two thousand companies in the data and this amount varies between 
1,651 (in year 2002) and 2,466 (in year 2006). Time distribution of our data is provided in 
Table 1. 
Summary statistics of all firm-level observations used in the analysis are provided in Table 
2. This is the dataset used when comparing aggregate R&D intensity across countries, using 
the structural vs. intrinsic decomposition (i.e., in Section 3). 
When we look at the EU-US R&D intensity comparison using firm level data (Section 4), we 
also want to control for company’s age. However, the Scoreboard does not provide 
information about age and so we had to match the Scoreboard with Orbis database19 and 
gather this information there.20 We were able to match only about 75% of Scoreboard 
companies. This means that the panel dataset with age is made up by 2,051 unique 
companies and 14,041 firm-year observations. 
As for sectors, while in Section 4 we use the original IBC classification, in Section 3 (i.e., 
when we look at the decomposition of the aggregate R&D intensity gap) we adopt an 
aggregation that is in line with the OECD methodology,21 hence grouping the original ICB 
sectors22 according to their average R&D intensity (across regions and time). We generate 
the following macro-sectors:  
 High R&D intensity aggregation (in which the average R&D intensity is above 5%): 
Biotechnology, Electronic office equipment, Health care equipment & services, 
                                                        
19  Orbis, Bureau van Dijk global database, has information on over 85 million companies. 
20  Data on company’s’ age for the 2008 Scoreboard have been kindly made available by Michele Cincera. 
21  Hatzichronoglou (1997).  
22  The Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) is a definitive system categorizing over 70,000 companies 
and 75,000 securities worldwide, enabling the comparison of companies across four levels of 
classification and national boundaries. The ICB system is supported by the ICB Database, an unrivalled 
data source for global sector analysis, which is maintained by FTSE International Limited. 
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Internet, Leisure goods, Pharmaceuticals, Semiconductors, Software, 
Telecommunications equipment 
 Medium to High R&D intensity aggregation (in which the R&D intensity is between 2 
and 5 %): Aerospace & defence, Alternative energy, Automobiles & parts, Chemicals, 
Commercial vehicles & trucks, Computer hardware, Computer services, Electrical 
components & equipment, Electronic equipment, General industrials, Household 
goods, Household goods & home construction, Industrial machinery, Support 
services 
 Medium to Low R&D intensity aggregation (where R&D intensity is between 1 and 
2%): Fixed line telecommunications, Food producers, Media, Oil equipment, services 
& distribution, Other financials, Personal goods, Tobacco 
 Low R&D intensity aggregation (where R&D intensity is below 1%): Banks, 
Beverages, Construction & materials, Electricity, Food & drug retailers, Forestry & 
paper, Gas, water & multi-utilities, General retailers, Industrial metals, Industrial 
metals & mining, Industrial transportation, Life insurance, Mining, Mobile 
telecommunications, Nonlife insurance, Oil & gas producers, Travel & leisure. 
This sectoral aggregation, together with broad ICB categories, is described in Table 3. 
In terms of regional aggregation, in Section 3 we focus on five world regions – EU, US, 
Japan, BRIC, and Asian Tigers- while in Section4 we only consider the EU-US R&D intensity 
gap. A complete description is provided in Table 4. 
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3. R&D intensity gap decomposition on macroeconomic data: EU 
versus US, Japan, Asian Tigers and BRIC 
In order to analyze the sources of the R&D intensity gap between main world regions, we 
decompose the aggregate gap between region A and region B into an intrinsic and a 
structural component: 
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where      
  is the R&D intensity of sector i in year t in region A (defined as R&D 
investment over sales) and    
  denotes the share of sector i in year t sales within region A 
total sales. The first term in equation (1) represents the intrinsic effect while the second 
term is the structural one.  
In practice, region A is always the EU23 (which is our reference region) while region B is, one 
at a time, the US, Japan, BRIC countries and Asian Tigers, respectively.  
The structural component measures the difference in R&D intensity due to industrial 
composition: it tells us weather the EU is more or less specialized (relatively to any of the 
other regions) in R&D intensive sectors. On the other hand, the intrinsic component captures 
the across-regional differences in within-sector R&D intensity.  
The results of these decompositions are depicted in Figure 1. Since the EU is always the 
reference region, a negative value means that a given region is more R&D intensive than 
the EU, while a positive value would indicate a relatively higher R&D intensity for the EU.  
Looking at the first of those four sub-figures, our analysis shows that the EU is on average 
less R&D intensive than the US (by about 2 percentage points) and that this gap has had an 
increasing trend over time (the blue line). The structural component (the green line), shows 
a very similar pattern and matches almost perfectly the total gap also in terms of its value. 
It follows that the intrinsic component is almost negligible, so that - within sectors - the EU 
                                                        
23  We also look at a within-EU decomposition and we find that the firms from the newly added countries 
tend to have an R&D intensity that is smaller than the one observed for companies belonging to the EU15 
countries. However, given the small relative size of such companies, the time profiles for R&D intensity for 
the EU15 and the EU27 are basically identical. Hence, in the paper we concentrate on the whole EU. 
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is on average as intensive as the US. In fact, at the beginning of the analyzed period, the 
intrinsic component was more favourable the EU, but there has been a decreasing pattern 
up to 2007, with some catching up thereafter. 
The broad picture that emerges from this simple decomposition is that there is a gap, that 
such gap has not decreased and that it is fundamentally a structural gap: within sectors EU 
companies do not exhibit a lower R&D intensity relative to their US competitors, however 
the EU economy is mostly specialized in sectors characterized by a relatively low R&D 
intensity (i.e., sectors that have low R&D intensity play a much bigger role in the EU 
economy than in the US). Overall, this results in the negative R&D intensity gap.  
The comparison between the EU and Japan exhibits a similar pattern. As a consequence of 
a different sectoral composition between these two regions, Japan is more R&D intensive 
than the EU (however, the R&D intensity gap with respect to Japan appears to be lower 
than the one relative to the US). While the EU is more R&D intensive within sectors, this 
positive contribution to the gap is completely offset by the structural component, which is 
even bigger than the total R&D intensity gap. Likewise, although the EU is more R&D 
intensive within sectors compared to Asian Tigers, its different sectoral composition is such 
that Asian Tigers are overall more R&D intensive than the EU. 
The BRIC is the only region not corresponding to above mentioned results. The EU is more 
R&D intensive than the BRIC and this gap is caused both by its higher R&D intensity within 
sectors and by its sectoral composition.  
Figure 2 describes the relationship between the R&D intensity gap and its 
structural/intrinsic components from a slightly different angle.24 Again, it depicts four 
graphs where the EU is compared against its four major world competitors. The first two 
graphs (EU vs. US and Japan) show almost identical patterns and the structural component 
follows closely the evolution of the total gap. During the period when the total gap 
becomes more negative (i.e., it increases in absolute value), the role of structural 
component decreases while, symmetrically, the one of the intrinsic component grows. The 
increase in the gap is due to either an increase in R&D intensity by US (or Japanese) firms 
or to a drop in R&D intensity by EU firms, but such a change is –on average- similar across 
                                                        
24  The intrinsic component is omitted here since its share would be just a mirror image of the structural 
component.  
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sectors (hence perhaps reflecting the impact of some public policy directed at stimulating 
R&D in the US or Japan or simply the fact that economic cycles are not aligned across 
countries). Once such short-run phenomenon disappears, the series for the R&D intensity 
gap goes back to its previous values and the structural effect becomes once again the 
dominant force. 
In the case of the BRIC region, the structural component oscillates between 0.55 and 0.7, 
leaving thus a lot of ‘room’ for the intrinsic component (which is likely to respond –once 
again- to short term variation in R&D intensity within sectors25).  
Finally, the graph for the Asian Tigers region shows an overall rather negligible total R&D 
intensity gap. Nevertheless, values for the ratio of the structural component highly above 1 
(except year 2002) suggest a strong and opposite role of the intrinsic component, which is 
also confirmed by our previous results. 
Overall, this analysis shows that the total R&D intensity gap relative to any of the other 
four regions, exhibits a decreasing trend up to years 2005-2006. This means that, relative 
to the regions that on average have a higher R&D intensity (US, Japan, and Asian Tigers), in 
the period 2002-2005, the gap between the EU and these competitors increases, while –at 
the same time- relative to the regions that have a lower R&D intensity (BRICS), the gap is 
reduced. In both cases this work at the disadvantage of the EU. After years 2005-2006 
there is some evidence that the position of the EU is improving relative to Japan and 
especially the Asian Tigers, but it is worsening relative to the US and to the BRICS 
(especially after 2008). Moreover, we see that the total gap and the share of the structural 
component over the total gap seem to be very strongly correlated (i.e., as the total gap 
increases the role of the structural component is reduced) when comparing the EU to Japan 
and the US,26 while the same does not happen when the EU is compared to BRIC and to the 
Asian Tigers (there is no clear correlation between the two series). 
Now we look more closely inside both the intrinsic and the structural component.  
                                                        
25  It is also possible that this variation depends upon the sample composition (i.e., the small number of firms 
belonging to the BRIC region). 
26  With the exception of the comparison with the US for the years after 2007, in which both the total R&D 
intensity gap and the share of the structural component are increasing, hence documenting that the UE is 
moving in the wrong direction. 
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We start with the intrinsic component. In Figure 3, we plot the R&D intensity gap separately 
for each of the four macro-sectors described at the end of Section 2 (all countries are 
compared to the EU within each macro-sector). From the upper left graph it is evident that 
there are almost no differences in R&D intensities among our five world regions within low 
R&D intensive sectors (those with R&D intensity below 1%) as all four lines are very flat 
and close to the zero line (all of them are in negative values, which means that the EU has 
lower R&D intensity). The graph for the medium-to-low R&D intensive sectors (those with 
R&D intensity between 1 and 2%), however, already shows some diversity. In this macro-
sector, firms in the BRIC region tend to be less R&D intensive than EU firms, while the 
opposite holds for Japanese firms. Firms in Asian Tigers and in the US do not perform very 
differently from EU firms (the gap is close to zero but there is some variation for Asian 
Tigers). An interesting result comes from the bottom-left graph about medium-to-high R&D 
intensive sectors (those with R&D intensity between 2 and 5%). Except when compared to 
Japanese firms (relative to which the difference is close to zero), EU firms tend to be more 
R&D intensive than those belonging to the remaining three regions. Finally, the biggest 
differences are shown in the bottom-right graph, which focuses on high R&D intensive 
sectors (those with R&D intensity above 5%) and documents a very contrasting result for 
the EU: the EU is much more R&D intensive than Japan, Asian Tigers or the BRIC (by about 
3-5%), but it is lagging behind the US by about 2 percentage points. 
These results suggest that although it might not be visible from the global economy 
perspective27 (Figure 1), there are some relevant across-country-within-sector differences 
(so that the intrinsic component cannot be entirely forgotten). This seems to be particularly 
evident when comparing the EU with the US and Japan: the US is more R&D intensive than 
the EU especially in high intensive sectors, while Japan (and Asian Tigers) are more R&D 
intensive mainly in low and medium to low intensive sectors. 
In the last part of this sub-section we document the evolution of the difference in sectoral 
weights (across the five regions) for each macro-sector (Figure 4). This exercise is meant to 
clarify the evolution of the sectoral composition (and hence bring some light on the sources 
of the structural component of the gap). This simple analysis tells us that the EU is much 
more specialized into the low intensive sectors than the three regions with higher overall 
                                                        
27  This happens because the across regions R&D intensity gap is weighted by the average size of the high-
tech macro-sector across any two regions. 
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R&D intensity (US, Japan and Asian Tigers). Additionally, the economic importance of 
medium- to-high R&D intensive sectors is lower in the EU than in those three previously 
mentioned regions. Finally, the EU is clearly at a disadvantage in the high R&D intensive 
sectors when compared to the US and Japan (but not when compared to BRIC or Asian 
Tigers). In other words, regions like the US, Japan or Asian Tigers are more oriented in 
sectors that require higher R&D intensity which, in sum, naturally results in the overall 
smaller R&D intensity in the EU. Similarly, the BRIC is more oriented in low intensive sectors 
than the EU and less oriented in medium- to-high and high intensive sectors, which makes 
it a less R&D intensive region than the EU. 
When we put together the pictures emerging from Figure 3 and Figure 4 we notice that the 
position of the EU relative to the US is of special interest. On the one hand, the EU is not 
able to shift production to higher R&D intensive sectors at a satisfying rate (relative to the 
US the positive gap in the low and the negative gap in high intensive sectors are both 
increasing), and, at the same time, when we look within the more R&D intensive sectors, EU 
firm are less R&D intensive than their American counterpart. Overall, the first effects 
greatly dominate over the second (the structural component dominates over the intrinsic 
component), but the problem is that they both work at the disadvantage of the EU relative 
to the US.  
In the next section we focus on the EU-US comparison and we verify whether these 
findings are confirmed when we use firm level data. This is very important because 
aggregate data28 comparisons hide many confounding factors. Only with micro data we 
have some hope to satisfy the ceteris-paribus condition, which allows us to capture the role 
of sectoral differentiation while controlling for some of the other explanatory variables 
affecting R&D intensity. 
                                                        
28  Even aggregate data obtained by aggregating firm level data. 
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4. R&D intensity gap using firm level data: EU versus US 
4.1  Empirical specifications 
In this section we focus on the EU-US comparison in R&D intensity, using firm-level data 
obtained by the Scoreboard unbalanced panels with company’s age among the relevant 
variables (as described in Section 2). Firm-level data are necessary if one wants to move 
beyond the aggregate characterization and capture the impact of each explanatory variable 
while controlling for the others (ceteris paribus hypothesis). For instance, if R&D intensity is 
responsive to business cycles and if the cycles are not perfectly aligned along calendar 
years, the cycle effect would impact on the comparison of R&D intensity between the EU 
and the US. Hence, if we want to compare R&D intensity within sectors and across regions 
we need to control for cycle components. Similarly, if R&D intensity changes with age and 
size of the firm, controlling for these two variables is essential if one wants to characterize 
R&D intensity across sectors or regions (or both).  
The underlying hypothesis of our work is that technology shapes the way in which R&D 
generates  (product and process) innovation and that this is very much a sector specific 
effect (i.e., the relationship between R&D and the technological frontier is sector specific). 
However, we are also interested in looking within sectors and testing whether aggregate 
differences among countries persist. In fact, we do not expect to observe the same within-
sector R&D intensity across countries (or macro-regions), since benefits and costs of R&D 
activity are likely to be very much country-region specific. Let’s think of a fictitious firm in 
the ICT sector that is considering investing in R&D to enhance its platform. The technology 
for this enhancement is available irrespective of the geographical location of the company, 
however the actual net benefit of implementing such a measure are largely dependent 
upon country (and, perhaps, local) conditions, such as the availability and cost of 
appropriate human resources, the availability and cost of funds, the size of the market in 
which the platform is meant to work and so on. From our perspective, it is interesting not 
only to capture across-sectoral differences, but also to verify if, within sectors, there is also 
evidence of regional variation. If we find that –once controlling for the other covariates- 
R&D intensity varies a lot across sectors, but –within sectors- there is no sign of across 
regional variation, we can conclude that the structural component is indeed at the source of 
the R&D intensity gap. If, on the contrary, we find that there is large across-regional 
variation but not much across-sectoral variation, we can conclude that the intrinsic 
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component is dominant. To test this we need to have both sector dummies and interaction 
terms between those dummies and the regional dummies (i.e., the EU/US dummy). 
However, we also have to control for the other (exogenous) factors that might affects R&D 
intensity, such as cycle effects, employment (a proxy for size), age and, eventually, some 
proxy for the availability of internal funds.  
Notice that in this section we use a finer sectoral partition, since we want to have a more 
precise idea of the relationship between R&D intensity and sectors (especially in light of the 
evidence on the role of the ICT and biotech sectors).  
In this section we present the results for two separate sets of regressions. In the first set 
we run three regressions. First, in Model (1), we regress the log of R&D intensity (measured 
at the firm level) on a regional dummy (EU vs. US), sector dummies, interactions between 
the sector dummies and the regional dummy, year dummies, a country (but not sector) 
specific variable capturing cycle effects and the log of the age of the company (not 
interacted with the regional dummy). The equation for Model (1) is: 
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where         is the natural logarithm of R&D intensity for a given firm,    are sector 
specific dummies,     is dummy value taking a value of 1 for US firms,    are year 
dummies,          is the variable representing GDP cycles and         is the natural 
logarithm of the age of the company. Subscripts i, c, s and t denotes company, country, 
sector and time, respectively. We allow the error terms to be correlated across observations 
for the same firm.29 
In the second regression - Model (2) - we add the log of employment, used as a proxy for 
firm size, but we do not interact it with the regional dummy. This specification is interesting 
because allows us to check whether age, per se, has some explanatory value once we 
control for firm size. Finally, in the third regression (Model (3)), we allow for log age and log 
                                                        
29  We do not run fixed effects estimation because we are very interested in the coefficients on the sector 
and country dummies, which would disappear if we differenced the data. 
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employment interactions with the regional dummy, in order to test whether the relationship 
between these two variables and R&D intensity varies significantly across regions. 
In the second set of regressions we introduce the log of the lagged value of the profit-to-
sales ratio, which might significantly affect R&D intensity if firms are someway constrained 
in their access to funds. We expect this variable to affect firms differently depending on 
their age, and so we run the same regression separately for three age categories (Model 
(4), Model (5) and Model (6)): Young (less than 15), Middle age (between 15 and 60) and 
Old (above 60) companies.  
The equation for Model (4), (5) and (6) is: 
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where             is the natural logarithm of the profits-to-sales ratio and          is 
the natural logarithm of firm employment (again, we allow the error terms to be correlated 
across observations for the same firm). 
The choice of selecting the age of 15 as a threshold between Young and Middle age 
companies arises from the realization that Venture Capital funding usually has an 
investment cycle no longer than 15 years. This means that, if EU and US firms face very 
different conditions in the market for funds, this is likely to show up even more for the 
"Below 15" group.  
The variable used to control for the cycle is obtained by HP filtering the series for GDP and 
then using the ratio of the cycle to the trend component for each country (so that the cycle 
effect is measured with comparable units across all countries). We also control for year 
dummies that, given the presence of the country-specific cycle components, capture 
common macro shocks.  
Controlling for employment is important because there is evidence that R&D investment 
does not growth linearly with firm size (see Cohen and Klepper, 1992; Cohen and Klepper, 
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1996; Ortega-Argilés and Brandsma, 2010) and smaller firms tend to have larger R&D 
intensity.  
Age is important for at least two reasons. First, young companies might have more 
problems in finding access to funds that are necessary to invest in R&D. Second, young 
companies have to be especially aggressive in terms of innovation if they want to enter 
and succeed in markets where incumbents already exist. The second effect would lead 
young firms to be more R&D intensive (relative to old companies), while the first one would 
lead them to have lower R&D intensity (again, when compared to older companies). More 
generally, there is vast evidence documenting that young EU firms do not grow sufficiently 
fast when compared to US firms (see Bartelsman et al. 2003 and Bartelsman et al. 2004). 
Finally, there is abundant evidence showing that the availability of internal funds matter for 
R&D intensity and we suspect that this relationship might be age and region specific (where 
regional variation reflects, among other things, institutional differences). 
We now look at the first set of results, where, while controlling for firm’s size and cyclical 
effects, we are able to estimate the across-sector and across-country variation in R&D 
intensity, its (common across sectors) age profile and to verify whether such age profile is 
significantly different in the US relative to the EU.  
4.2  Results 
When it comes to the structural vs. intrinsic debate, our results from Model (1) (see Table 5) 
show strong evidence of significant within-region-across-sector variation in R&D intensity, 
but less evidence of within-sector-across-region variation. In the EU, the most R&D 
intensive sectors (the reference sector is Oil & Gas) are: Technology Hardware and 
Equipment, Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology, Software and Computer Services, Health 
Care Equipment and Services, Aerospace and Defence and Electronic and Electrical 
Equipment.  When comparing across regions and within sectors we find that the US are less 
intensive in the Telecommunication and Aerospace and Defence, while they are more 
intensive in the Utilities and Financials sectors. Notice that these results are confirmed in 
Models (2) and (3), the only change being the ordering concerning the Aerospace vs. the 
Health Care sector.30 
                                                        
30  For brevity sake we do not present the coefficients on the sector dummies for Model (2) and (3). However, 
they can be provided upon request to the authors. 
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With the exception of the Financials sector, for which the difference between the EU and 
the US is very large, the within-region-across-sector variation, when significant, tends to be 
larger than the within-sector-across-region variation. Moreover, while in two sectors EU 
firms perform less R&D than their US counterparts, the opposite is true in other two 
sectors. In our opinion this confirms the prevalence of the structural effects over the 
intrinsic effect: on average EU firms are not less R&D intensive than US firms. 
Coming to the age variable (see Table 6), the results of Model (1) indicate that log R&D 
intensity tends to decrease as (the log of) age increases, which is not unexpected given the 
type of selection process we are dealing with (only high R&D performers are selected); 
however this result is not robust to the introduction of the log of employment (i.e., firms 
size): see Model (2).  When we allow for region-age and region-employment interactions -
Model (3)- we have the following results: the age profile for R&D appears to be quite 
different in the EU relative to the US, since the coefficient on log age is positive for the EU 
and negative for the US,31 while there is no evidence of a different profile with respect to 
firm size: in both countries log R&D intensity is negatively related to log employment and 
there is no significant interaction between size and the US dummy. This result is interesting 
because it seems to indicate that young companies in the EU perform differently from 
young firms in the US with respect to R&D decisions, pointing to the different functioning of 
financial markets in the two regions.  
Notice that we have some evidence that R&D intensity varies positively with the cycle 
(hence showing that R&D grow more than sales in boom times and they contract more in 
recessions), even when controlling for common macro shocks. However, the cycle 
component variable is not statistically significant (we still keep it since there might be some 
collinearity with year dummies) 
To get a better understanding of the determinants of R&D intensity, in the second set of 
regressions we test whether log R&D intensity is affected by the abundance of internal 
funds (as captured by the log of the profit/sales ratio) and if the relationship between R&D 
and internal funds changes with the age of the company. Our estimates (Table 6, Models 
                                                        
31  We have also tried a specification in which the log of firm's age is interacted with sector dummies, in 
order to verify whether differences between the US and the EU are mainly due to a different sectorial 
composition in the two regions. Our results, not reported here for sake of brevity, indicate that this is not 
the case: (i.e., there is no evidence of sector specific age profiles). 
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(4), (5) and (6)) show that there are relevant across-region and across-age group 
differences.  
On the one hand, when looking at EU companies, we find that the proxy for internal funds 
enters with a positive and significant coefficient only for the Young and the Middle age 
group, and that the size of the estimated coefficient is declining as we move from the 
Young to the Middle age group,32 which is expected, since –on average- access to external 
funds might become easier when companies grow and accumulate both reputation and 
assets.  
On the other hand, when we compare EU to US firms within each age group, we notice that 
Young firms in the US react to internal funds in a very different way: the interaction 
between the US dummy and the log of profit-to-sales ratio is negative and significant and 
the value of the overall coefficient on the log of profit-to-sales ratio for US Young firms 
(the sum of the coefficient on log of profit-to-sales ratio and the interaction term just 
mentioned) is not significantly different from zero, documenting that US firms do not really 
seem to be constrained by the availability of internal funds. When we look at the Middle 
age and Old groups, there is really no evidence of an across-region significant difference in 
the relationship between our dependent variable and lagged log profit-to-sales ratio, so 
that, for these groups, US firms do not behave differently from EU firms (hence Middle age 
US firms show a positive and significant relationship -at 90% confidence level- between 
the log of R&D intensity and the log of profit-to-sales ratio, while older firms do not). 
We have also tested if and how these results are dependent upon the age categorization, 
by trying different specifications, changing the upper limit of the Young group, both adding 
and subtracting 5 years,33 and we have found that they remain substantially unchanged. 
 
                                                        
32  Similarly, the coefficient is higher for the Middle age group than for the Old group, for which, however, it is 
not statistically different from zero at a 90% confidence level. 
33  Given that we change the upper limit of the interval for Young firms, it follows that the lower limit of the 
interval for Middle age firms is affected as well. The group of Older firms is not affected by the rescaling. 
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5. Conclusions 
In this report, using data from the Industrial Scoreboard for the years 2002-2010 we look 
at the R&D intensity gap between the EU and its major competitors from two different but 
complementary perspectives. In the first part of the report we study the evolution of the 
overall R&D intensity gap and of its structural and intrinsic components. Our analysis 
reveals that the EU is less R&D intensive than the US, Japan or Asian Tigers. This gap is, 
however, not caused by an overall lower intensity within sectors but rather by different 
sectoral compositions. In all three comparisons, the structural components play a strong 
role, leaving little room for the intrinsic components and showing that, on average, the EU 
is specialized in sectors with low or medium R&D intensity, while US, Japan and Asian 
Tigers are more oriented on more R&D intensive sectors. In fact, when we look within 
sectors, we find that sometimes the EU is even more R&D intensive than these three 
regions. When compared to the BRIC region, the EU is more R&D intensive and this is a 
consequence of both higher R&D intensive activities within sectors and sectoral 
composition in favour of highly R&D intensive industries. 
In the second part of the report we move to firm-level analysis and we find a confirmation 
that across-sector differences dominate over within-sector differences. In particular we find 
that in the EU, (the reference sector is Oil & Gas), the highest R&D intensity is found in the 
Technology Hardware and Equipment, Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology, Software and 
Computer Services, Health Care Equipment and Services, Aerospace and Defence and 
Electronic and Electrical Equipment sectors. When we compare the EU to the US we find 
that US companies are less R&D intensive in the Telecommunication, Aerospace and 
Defence while they are more intensive in the Utilities and Financials sectors. However, the 
within-sector-across-region variation, when significant, is smaller in size than the within-
region-across-sector variation. We also find that the age profile is radically different across 
the two regions: with a positive slope in the EU and a negative one in the US, even after 
controlling for a proxy for firms size (the log of employment, which enters with a negative 
and significant coefficient: EU and US firms do not seem to perform differently). Finally, 
when we look at the role of the log of lagged profit-to-sales ratio, we find that this variable 
is highly and positively correlated to the dependent variable for the young and middle aged 
firms in the EU, with a coefficient declining as we move from the first to the second group. 
However, for US firms, we find no evidence that the proxy for internal funds affects log 
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R&D intensity for the group of Young and Old firms, while it does so for the Middle age 
group (for which the coefficient is not significantly different from the one registered for EU 
companies).  
Overall, our results show that –for top R&D investing young firms- the relationship between 
R&D intensity and the availability of internal funds is very different in the US and in the EU. 
However, such differences disappear when we look at the remaining age groups. This 
seems to point out at the crucial role of early funding: in the US, young (top R&D investing) 
companies have access to external funding via Venture Capital or other sources of seed 
funding (private and public), so that the (relative size of) R&D investment does not depend 
on internal funds. For EU young (top R&D investing) companies this does not appear to be 
the case. The disappearance of significant across-regional differences when we move 
beyond the Young age group confirms that early Venture Capital financing and/or public 
policies directed at favouring early stage R&D investment are crucial.   
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Appendix 
Table 1: Number of companies by year. 
  N % 
2002 1 651 8.60         
2003 1 854         9.65        
2004 2 139        11.14        
2005 2 444        12.72 
2006 2 466        12.84        
2007 2 450 12.76        
2008 2 257 11.75        
2009 2 077 10.81        
2010 1 869 9.73 
Total 19 207  
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics. 
  N mean sd min max 
R&D (mil. EUR) 19 207 177 565 0 7 610 
sales (mil. EUR) 19 207 5 573 15 936 0 329 760 
R&D intensity (R&D/sales) 19 207 3 187 0 18 478 
profit (mil. EUR) 19 207 499 2 257 -91 960 59 356 
employment 18 067 20 558 50 131 50 1 600 000 
age 14 041 49 47 0 440 
 
Table 3: Sector division by ICB1 categories and R&D intensity. 
  N % 
Oil & Gas 445 2.32         
Basic Materials 1 577         8.21        
Industrials 4 929        25.66        
Consumer Goods 2 609        13.58 
Health Care 2 888        15.04        
Consumer Services 777 4.05        
Telecommunications 249 1.30        
Utilities 410 2.13        
Financials 580 3.02        
Technology 4 743        24.69       
Low R&D intensive 2 531        13.18        
Medium to Low R&D intensive 2 312         12.04        
Medium to High R&D intensive 6 960        36.24        
High R&D intensive 7 404        38.55       
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Table 4: Regional division. 
Country                                    Region N % 
Austria 302         3.01         
Belgium 366         3.65         
Czech Republic 33         0.33         
Denmark 408         4.07        
Finland 595         5.94        
France 1 131        11.29        
Germany 1 955        19.51        
Greece 61         0.61        
Hungary 24 0.24        
Ireland 143 1.43        
Italy 481         4.80        
Latvia 4 0.04        
Luxembourg 73 0.73        
Malta 10 0.10        
Netherlands 510 5.09        
Poland 44 0.44        
Portugal 52 0.52        
Slovakia 4         0.04        
Slovenia 22         0.22        
Spain 241 2.41        
Sweden 744 7.43        
UK 2 815 28.10       
EU 10 018        52.16       
USA 5 621        29.27        
US 5 621        29.27        
Japan 2 410        12.55 
Japan 2 410        12.55 
Brazil 64 17.49        
China 135 36.89        
India 142 38.80 
Russia 25 6.83       
BRIC 366 1.91        
Hong Kong 57 7.20         
Singapore 44 5.56        
South Korea 229 28.91        
Taiwan 462 58.33       
Asian Tigers 792 4.12       
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Figure 1: Decomposition of the R&D intensity gap into structural and intrinsic 
components. 
 
This figure presents the decomposition of the R&D intensity gap into structural and intrinsic 
components for four major world competitors of the EU. R&D intensity is defined as a ratio of 
sector R&D over Sales. The reference region is always the EU. A negative value means that a region 
is more R&D intensive than the EU, while a positive value would indicate a higher R&D intensity of 
the EU. 
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Figure 2: The share of structural component in the total R&D intensity gap. 
 
This figure presents the evolution of the total R&D intensity gap and the share of structural 
component in it for the four major world competitors of the EU. The reference region is always the 
EU. The right hand side axis represents the ratio of the structural component in the total gap (red 
line). 
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Figure 3: R&D intensity gap across regions and sectors. 
 
This figure presents the R&D intensity gap for four major world competitors of the EU and for four 
sectoral categories defined in Data section. The reference region is always the EU. A negative value 
means that a region is more R&D intensive than the EU, while a positive value would indicate a 
higher R&D intensity of the EU. 
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Figure 4: Sector weights across regions. 
 
This figure presents the difference in macro-sector weights for the four sectoral categories defined 
in Data section and for four major world competitors of the EU. The reference region is always the 
EU. A negative value means that a sector in a region has bigger weight in its economy than the 
same sector within the EU economy. 
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Table 5: Sector dummies and interaction with the US dummy from Model (1) 
 
This table presents the results form firm level estimation for the period 2002-2010. Only the EU 
and US are considered. 
 
 Variables Coef/Se   Variables Coef/Se 
     
Constant -4.5574  US dummy  0,4268 
 (0,2508)   (0,4377) 
Basic Materials dummy 0,5789**  US*Basic Materials dummy 0,1133 
 (0,2689)   (0,4716) 
Industrials dummy  
(without 271 and 273) 
0,8360*** 
 US*Industrials dummy  
(without 271 and 273) 
-0,1070 
 (0,2493)   (0,4532) 
Consumer Goods dummy 1,1089***  US*Consumer Goods dummy -0,1392 
 (0,2556)   (0,4617) 
Consumer Services dummy -0,0011  US*Consumer Services dummy 0,9981 
 (0,3378)   (0,6679) 
Telecommunications dummy 0,4168  US*Telecommunications dummy -1,0008** 
 (0,2884)   (0,4678) 
Utilities dummy -0,5702*  US*Utilities dummy 1,0846** 
 (0,3238)   (0,4906) 
Financials dummy 0,4179  US*Financials dummy 1,8131*** 
 (0,2998)   (0,4813) 
Aerospace & Defense dummy 2,0047***  US*Aerospace & Defense dummy -0,9221* 
 (0,2612)   (0,4775) 
Electronic & Electrical Equipment dummy 1,8943*** 
 US*Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
dummy 
-0,2285 
 (0,2552)   (0,4756) 
Health care equipment & services dummy 2,0966*** 
 US*Health care equipment & services 
dummy 
-0,2096 
 (0,2688)   (0,4616) 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology dummy 2,7158*** 
 US*Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 
dummy 
-0,0682 
 (0,2620)   (0,4606) 
Software & Computer Services dummy 2,6094*** 
 US*Software & Computer Services 
dummy 
-0,0657 
 (0,2536)   (0,4512) 
Technology Hardware & Equipment dummy 2,8490*** 
 US*Technology Hardware & Equipment 
dummy 
-0,2959 
 (0,2478)   (0,4481) 
     
Year dummies yes    
R2 0.515    
N 10,325    
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table 6: cycle, age, employment and their interactions with the US dummy for 
Models (1), (2) and (3). Log of lagged profit-to-sales ratio for Models (4), (5) and 
(6) 
 
 
 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Variables Coef/Se Coef/Se Coef/Se Coef/Se Coef/Se Coef/Se 
Constant -4.5574*** -2.5665*** -2.5902*** -1.6721*** -1.8722*** -3.5581*** 
  (0.2508) (0.2436) (0.2789) (0.4874) (0.4533) (0.6194) 
GDP cycle 0.1941 -0.0193 0.0131 0.2345 -0.5690 0.2349 
  (0.1938) (0.1740) (0.1724) (0.5801) (0.3727) (0.3225) 
ln(age) -0.0929*** 0.0340 0.0580*    
  (0.0253) (0.0243) (0.0298)    
US* ln(age)   -0.0952*    
    (0.0494)    
ln(employment)  -0.2712*** -0.2781*** -0.2922*** -0.3508*** -0.1299*** 
   (0.0182) (0.0231) (0.0442) (0.0397) (0.0391) 
US* ln(employment)   0.0331 -0.0131 0.0606 0.0460 
    (0.0352) (0.0663) (0.0626) (0.0596) 
L.ln(profit/sales)    0.2555*** 0.1107** 0.0924 
     (0.0771) (0.0508) (0.0704) 
US*L.ln(profit/sales)    -0.2209*** -0.0286 -0.1185 
        (0.0830) (0.0657) (0.0792) 
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.515 0.592 0.593 0.639 0.658 0.420 
N 10,325 10,235 10,235 1,497 2,968 2,639 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Abstract 
In this report, we look at the evolution of Europe's R&D intensity gap relative to the US and its main competitors, using data 
from repeated waves (2002-2010) of the Industrial Scoreboard, which collects data from top R&D performers in Europe 
and in the rest of the world (US, Japan, BRIC, Asian Tigers). First we decompose the R&D intensity gap into a structural and 
an intrinsic component and, comparing the EU to its main competitors, we find that the gap is largely structural and that 
Europe's position relative to any of the other four regions, has worsened during the years 2005-2006. Since then, it has 
slightly improved relative to Japan and especially the Asian Tigers, but it has definitely worsened relative to the US and to 
the BRICS. In the second part of the paper, we focus on the EU-US comparison and, using firm-level data, we confirm the 
structural interpretation. We also find that European young companies seem to depend much more on their internal 
resources for the financing of R&D when compared to US young companies. This suggests that policies directed at financing 
young innovative companies might play a role in closing the EU-US R&D intensity gap. 
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As the Commission’s in-house science service, the Joint Research Centre’s mission is to provide EU 
policies with independent, evidence-based scientific and technical support throughout the whole 
policy cycle. 
 
Working in close cooperation with policy Directorates-General, the JRC addresses key societal 
challenges while stimulating innovation through developing new standards, methods and tools, 
and sharing and transferring its know-how to the Member States and international community. 
 
Key policy areas include: environment and climate change; energy and transport; agriculture and 
food security; health and consumer protection; information society and digital agenda; safety and 
security including nuclear; all supported through a cross-cutting and multi-disciplinary approach. 
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